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ABSTRACT  28 
Rationale, aims and objectives 29 
The article looks at how, during consultations, pregnant women identified as presenting an 30 
increased risk of giving birth to a child with an impairment, and practitioners in the field of 31 
prenatal diagnosis, decide whether or not to accept the risk of a miscarriage and proceed with a 32 
diagnostic examination.  33 
Methods 34 
We conducted 63 observations of consultations in France and 22 in England. Participants were 35 
women for whom an elevated risk of abnormality had been identified and the practitioners 36 
involved in their care. 37 
Our analytical approach consisted in suspending the normative concepts of non-directiveness 38 
and autonomy, and in drawing on Goffman’s (1974) notion of “frame” to take account of the 39 
experiential and structural aspects that the protagonists bring into the (inter)actions.  40 
Results 41 
We identified four frames: medico-scientific expertise, medical authority, religious authority 42 
and compassion. Observation of the ways in which the frames intertwine during consultations 43 
revealed configurations that facilitate or hinder the fluidity of the interactions and the decision-44 
making process. The medico-scientific expertise frame, imposed by the guidelines, heavily 45 
dominated our observations, but frequently caused distress and misunderstanding. Temporary 46 
or sustained use of the compassion and/or medical authority frames could help to repair the 47 
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discussion and create the conditions that enable women/couples to reach a decision. Variations 48 
in configuration highlighted the differences between practitioners in the two countries.  49 
Conclusions 50 
 Combining frames allows protagonists to exert reflective abilities and to maintain/restore 51 
interactions. The frame analysis promotes a vision of autonomy that is sociological, relational 52 
and processual rather than philosophical. The frames are anchored in different structural 53 
conditions in England and France.  54 
 55 
INTRODUCTION 56 
Pregnancy-related genetic counselling has developed significantly since the 1970s and the 57 
liberalisation of abortion. Eager to dissociate themselves from eugenic practices, practitioners 58 
placed women’s decision-making autonomy at the centre of their work.1 This orientation is 59 
more broadly embedded in the international context of the rise of bioethics, of women’s and 60 
disability movements and of the shift over to the ‘therapeutic modernity’ model, characterised 61 
by more standardised healthcare practices, regulated away from the doctor-patient relationship 62 
by central bodies that articulate evidence-based medicine with a procedural and “juridicised” 63 
vision of ethics. 2,3 64 
In this context, the concept of autonomy is based on a Western, modern conception of 65 
individuals as rationale beings.4 It goes hand-in-hand with the principle of “non-directiveness” 66 
that is now an integral part of the prenatal diagnosis (PND) guidelines.5  67 
In the field of PND, the choice between two risks – that of a child being born with an 68 
impairment, versus that of the loss of a healthy child following amniocentesis – has strongly 69 
influenced the way pregnancy is monitored. The generalisation of antenatal screening and of 70 
increasingly effective imaging techniques now makes it possible to identify “high-risk 71 
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pregnancies” and detect a large number of anomalies, whilst limiting the loss of healthy 72 
foetuses.  73 
ORGANISATION OF PRACTICES 74 
In countries where abortion is legal, PND is based on a sequence of standardised decisions and 75 
actions. The first decision-action event is Down Syndrome (DS) screening, offered to all 76 
pregnant women in England and France, usually during their first pregnancy consultation.6 77 
There are nevertheless differences in screening uptake (75% of pregnant women in England, 78 
85% in France).7,8 Similarly, the threshold at which the risk is deemed sufficient to warrant a 79 
fetal karyotype examination varies (1:150 in England; 1:250 in France). Routine foetal 80 
ultrasound examinations carried out at different points during the pregnancy (two in England 81 
and three in France) enable practitioners to check that the foetus is developing normally and 82 
look for soft markers frequently associated with anomalies.9 83 
Once identified as being “at increased risk”, women are referred to PND centres located in 84 
public hospitals. Then follows the second decision-action event involving diagnostic tests. This 85 
usually means the extraction of amniotic fluid (amniocentesis) or sampling of trophoblast cells 86 
(Chorionic villus sampling: CVS) with an estimated 1% risk of triggering a miscarriage.10 87 
Whilst some abnormalities can be surgically repaired in utero or after birth, most of the 88 
anomalies discovered are incurable;11 the women and couples may then begin a third sequence 89 
of decision-action in relation to a pregnancy termination.  90 
A PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT 91 
When a risk is identified, practitioners must provide the woman/couple with “information on 92 
the nature of the suspected affection, on the means of detecting it and possibilities for 93 
prevention, treatment, or suitable care for the foetus or child born”. 11,12 The aim is to enable 94 
women to make autonomous decisions and informed reproductive choices. Yet information 95 
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about Down syndrome is often absent from the consultations.13 Research on women’s decision-96 
making emphasises the diversity of women’s beliefs about ethics,14 their interpretation of 97 
informed choice,15 and their attitudes about knowledge sources.16 Evidence also suggests that 98 
some women view choice as an individual right, while others prefer relying on practitioners’ 99 
advice.17,18 Other studies indicate that it is often difficult for practitioners to comply with 100 
neutrality and non-directiveness.19 101 
Practitioners admit to being directive in certain situations,17,20 as they make assumptions on 102 
women’s scientific and linguistic skills, their religious beliefs, and knowledge of abortion 103 
legislation.21,22 Direct observations of counselling practices demonstrate the complexity of 104 
women and practitioners’ interactions, which is largely caused by differing interpretations of 105 
the concept of risk.23 Schwennesen and Koch observed that the act of « doing good care », by 106 
minimising emotional suffering and supporting a pregnant woman’s ability to make meaningful 107 
choices, is difficult to reconcile with the ideal of non-directiveness. 24 108 
The difficulty to adopt the recommended non-directive approach poses important questions. On 109 
one hand, it might reveal the persistence of a form of paternalism in the relationship between 110 
women and practitioners, with the latter possibly struggling to accept women’s autonomy in 111 
decision-making. On the other hand, it might reflect a conception of autonomy that is too 112 
restrictive to take account of the relational dynamics taking place in clinical consultations. To 113 
address these questions, it is essential to examine what the interactions between women and 114 
practitioners consist of by suspending, during the analytical process, any normative reference 115 
to autonomy and non-directiveness.  116 
 117 
In this article, we focus on the second sequence of decision-action in PND pathways, where 118 
women identified as being “at risk” are sent to referral centres where they must decide whether 119 
to continue with the investigations or not.  120 
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In line with pragmatic sociology, using Frame Analysis,25 we first describe and categorise the 121 
interactions that take place during the consultations, the way women and practitioners engage 122 
and adjust to these interactions, as well as the conditions that facilitate or hinder the 123 
protagonists’ expression of their reflective capacities. This then lead us to consider and 124 
challenge the philosophical conception of autonomy, and propose, instead, a sociological 125 
conception of autonomy that is both relational and processual, and which we discuss in relation 126 
to the organisation of PDN practices in England and France. 127 
 128 
METHODS AND MATERIALS 129 
Our analysis is based on observations of PND consultations to which women are referred when 130 
there is an increased risk of foetal anomaly. Sixty-three observations were conducted in France 131 
between 2010 and 2012 in a PND referral centre in the Paris region, which receives a high 132 
proportion of immigrant women, most of them from North Africa, and in a provincial centre 133 
which treats a mixed population. Twenty-two observations, involving a mixed population, were 134 
conducted in England in 2013, in a gynaecological and obstetric unit in a hospital that practices 135 
foetal medicine and in a foetal medicine unit in a referral centre. In our observations, the 136 
increased risk resulted from DS screening (39), ultrasound imagery (24), genetic/obstetric 137 
history (12), maternal age (8) and toxoplasma infections (2).  138 
We must begin by pointing out a difference between the two countries in terms of health 139 
pathways. In England, women are informed of their risk and only sent to a referral centre if they 140 
consider that taking a sample is an option. A midwife then goes over the information on the 141 
risks before obtaining the woman’s consent. An ultrasound examination is then performed; the 142 
consultant answers any questions the women may have and the sample is taken. In France, all 143 
women “at risk” are referred to a PND centre. Approximately one third of the consultations 144 
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follow the same format as those in England. The remainder are conducted by a midwife alone, 145 
who provides information. No medical act is performed.  146 
The study received ethical approval in France from a Research ethics committee (Anonymised) 147 
and in England from the Health Research Authority (anonymised) and the University of 148 
(Anonymised) ethics committee. Consultations lasted between 25 and 70 minutes. 40 women 149 
attended the consultations on their own, 42 were accompanied by their partners and three by 150 
someone else. The authors were present during the consultations. Field notes were made to 151 
capture the communication’s content and delivery as well as non-verbal expressions. In 152 
England, the consultations were also recorded and transcribed verbatim.  153 
 154 
The analysis, conducted by both authors, draws on Grounded Theory.26 It focuses on the nature 155 
and properties of the (inter)actions taking place during the consultations and how these are 156 
combined to enable a decision regarding the management of the pregnancy to be reached. These 157 
interactions are heterogeneous and relate to medical practices, their organisation and regulation.  158 
Yet most of these actions are “speech acts”,27 i.e. discourses which inform, reassure or worry, 159 
protect, advise, influence, etc.  160 
Based on frame analysis,25 the first analytical stage consisted of identifying the different frames 161 
mobilised by protagonists during the consultations. The frames act as guides to action, they 162 
convey ordinary meanings of what takes place in a situation and of the ways people behave 163 
therein. The second analytical stage, which draws on “combinatory pragmatics”,28 consisted of 164 
identifying from the combination of frames and their impact on the interactions, the different 165 






FRAMES OF DECISION-MAKING AT WORK IN PND CONSULTATIONS 170 
We identified four frames from the interactions we observed. Three of these carry the rational 171 
resources that might guide the decision-making: the frames of medico-scientific expertise, 172 
medical authority and religious authority. A fourth frame offers resources that can mitigate the 173 
emotional charge and thus supports the interactions; we call it the compassion frame.  174 
 175 
 The medico-scientific expertise frame 176 
This frame was predominant in our observations, articulating a moral stance that supports the 177 
actors’ ability to make rational and autonomous choices3,4 with a grid for understanding 178 
situations based on the medico-scientific rationale at work in evidence-based medicine. This is 179 
the frame that dominates the ‘therapeutic modernity’.2 Practitioners are tasked with helping 180 
women decide whether to continue with the investigations, and therefore accept the risk of 181 
miscarriage when a sample is taken. This presupposes that women have acquired sufficient 182 
expertise regarding the model for calculating risks and interpreting their significance, and that 183 
practitioners have provided clear information without engaging their own subjectivity. The 184 
actions taking place within this frame thus essentially involve providing/receiving/asking for 185 
scientific and technical information relating to the nature of the risks, their value and mode of 186 
calculation, how the medical acts are performed, and the aetiology and consequences of the 187 
suspected pathologies.  188 
All the consultations we observed began in the medico-scientific expertise frame with the 189 
practitioner explaining the risk as being the reason for the consultation. “I’m seeing you today 190 
to discuss the results of the blood test. It allows us to evaluate the statistical risk of having a 191 
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child with Down Syndrome. Your risk is…” (Midwife, France). Detailed technical information 192 
is then provided, depending on the type of risk.  193 
 “It would appear that you have contracted a toxoplasmosis. […] The risk of transmission 194 
increases with the term. At the beginning of the pregnancy it is 1%, at 9 months it is 80% of 195 
babies who are contaminated. [but]the consequences are not the same. If it is before 15 weeks, 196 
there can be serious consequences. Toxoplasmosis attacks the entire organism but the most 197 
serious consequences are on the brain” (Consultant, France).  198 
Once the information on possible foetal anomalies has been given, the practitioner provides 199 
details on the risk of miscarriage when a sample is taken. The risk is frequently weighted by 200 
information on the expertise of the operator, designed to reassure:  201 
“The risk here is lower than the national average and the reason for that is because we do these 202 
tests every day… and of course the consultants that do these tests do them all the time, so they 203 
are experienced. So your risk of miscarriage as you enter the room is less” (Midwife, England). 204 
In England, practitioners also explain another risk, that of the culture of amniotic cells not 205 
giving any meaningful result or ending in a ‘laboratory failure’, estimated at less than 1%.  206 
Given the technical nature of the information, the medico-scientific expertise frame is a 207 
demanding one as it requires the appropriation of complex knowledge. Therefore, practitioners 208 
often employ sophisticated strategies such as the lottery metaphor, frequently used in the 209 
consultations observed in the Parisian centre: “Your risk is 1:197. It’s as if your uterus was the 210 
lottery chamber, there are 196 white balls and one red; but we don’t know which one is in your 211 
tummy” (Midwife, France).  212 
 213 
The medical authority frame 214 
10 
 
As a persistent form of doctor-patient relationship rooted in the “clinical tradition”, in the 215 
medical authority frame and by virtue of their experience, clinicians can legitimately express 216 
opinions, give advice and orient the decisions of their patients.2 This frame is difficult to 217 
reconcile with that of the medico-scientific expertise, which established itself as the opposite 218 
of the medical authority paradigm. It is, therefore, only brought into play when the course of 219 
(inter)actions requires some adjustment. The analysis of our observations reveals three reasons 220 
for turning to medical authority.  221 
Medical authority to repair the exchanges 222 
A situation may occur where the practitioner suddenly realises that the information he/she has 223 
just given, is upsetting the woman and/or her partner. It is often when he/she is coming to the 224 
end of his/her expert explanations by asking if there are any questions, that the woman expresses 225 
her concerns. At this stage, some practitioners use the medical authority frame as a way of 226 
“repairing” the emotional harm that the medico-scientific discourse has caused. This might 227 
mean a brief incursion during which the practitioner sets aside the neutral attitude and adopts 228 
that of the benevolent authority of someone who has the answers and can be trusted. At the very 229 
least, this comes in the form of a comment that qualifies the information that have just been 230 
given: “You know the information now, don’t think about that anymore […] we are very, very 231 
positive here in terms of the situation. I mean it sounds very good.” (Midwife, England)  232 
The practitioner will occasionally engage his/her subjectivity before picking up the threads of 233 
the medico-scientific arguments. In the Parisian unit, repair sometimes goes hand-in-hand with 234 
a justification that the practitioner uses to free him/herself from the recommended principle of 235 
neutrality, so as to better adjust to the woman’s distress: “You are 30 years old. The neck is 236 
thin. I’m not worried but we have to have this conversation […] I have to give you the most 237 




Medical authority requested by women: delegating the decision 240 
Women may turn to the medical authority frame by explicitly asking for the practitioner’s 241 
opinion. More often than not, the practitioner will maintain a neutral stance:“I’m not the one 242 
who will be holding this baby in my arms. It would be dishonest of me to say ‘in your position 243 
I would do it’”, (Midwife, France), which sometimes causes tension in the discussion as seen 244 
from this consultation in England: 245 
Woman: What do you think we should do? 246 
Consultant: I can't tell you.  247 
Woman: Of course you can! 248 
Consultant: Our personalities are not the same. 249 
Woman: You should still tell us. 250 
Consultant: Doctors can't tell you what to do in these circumstances. 251 
Woman: I think you should. 252 
The neutral attitude can sometimes be interpreted as the practitioner’s disengagement from the 253 
clinical relationship, thus causing the women to feel abandoned.29 254 
More rarely, practitioners will accept delegation of the decision following an explicit request 255 
from women who do not wish to engage in an expert approach and who wish to leave it up to 256 
professionals. The asymmetry is chosen and accepted with due regard for the protagonists. In 257 
France for example, with a certain amount of assurance, a woman of African origin interrupts 258 
the obstetrician’s explanations by saying: “Doctor, it’s you who decides, because we don’t know 259 
anything about all this!” The request is understood and the practitioner accepts the delegation. 260 
He questions the couple on several occasions so as to adapt his advice to suit their expectations, 261 
understands that for religious reasons abortion is not an option, and to the satisfaction of the 262 
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couple, concludes: “In my opinion no sample should be taken. You say I am the doctor and that 263 
I must advise you. That is my advice.” (Consultant, France). 264 
 265 
Although certain English practitioners sometimes accept to give an opinion, this does not mean 266 
that the neutrality and objectiveness, characteristic of the medico-scientific expertise, are set 267 
aside. Each opinion is accompanied by a technical argument to such an extent that the frames 268 
of expertise and medical authority are very much entwined.  269 
For example, during the ultrasound examination preceding a planned CVS, and when the 270 
development of the foetus seems to be normal, the woman is submerged by doubt:  271 
Woman: So, do you think we should still go for the CVS? 272 
After explaining the advantages and limitations of imaging and karyotyping, the consultant 273 
concludes: “It’s true that the scan is not 100% reliable, okay? So it’s two complementary 274 
things”.  275 
Woman: So because the nuchal scan was 2.8mm, that’s why we want to go ahead and get this 276 
done. 277 
Consultant: It is your choice. 278 
Woman: But you think that’s good still to do? 279 
Consultant: Yes! If you want to have peace of mind, this is not unreasonable. 280 
Woman: And the chance of miscarriage is so small that you think... 281 
Consultant: It’s slightly less than 1 in 100 282 
Woman: So it’s worth it... 283 




Imposed medical authority: orienting the decision 286 
In some cases, medical authority is imposed without being requested by the woman/couple. 287 
This is often the case in France when women are hesitating to have a sample taken. They are 288 
often dissuaded from doing so if they are determined to keep the child they are carrying. For 289 
example, the midwife explained to a couple carrying the drepanocytosis gene: “We can make 290 
the diagnosis before birth, but we need to ask what we’re going to do. If [the foetus] is affected, 291 
are we going to terminate the pregnancy?” Following the woman’s negative response, she 292 
continued: “the only thing we can do is an amniocentesis. But there’s a risk of miscarriage. 293 
That’s why, if you wish to keep this child, it’s better not to do [the amniocentesis]” (Midwife, 294 
France).  295 
Finally, the practitioner’s attitude can be clearly directive when there is a strong presumption 296 
of anomaly. In France, for example, the consultant immediately told a 45-year-old woman: “As 297 
you have unfavourable blood results, with a very high level of hormones, this suggests a risk of 298 
chromosomal anomaly. It would be a good idea to rapidly have an amniocentesis to reassure 299 
you.” When facing what is considered to be a high risk, there is pressure to move fast.  300 
 301 
The religious authority frame 302 
The religious authority frame is sometimes mobilised during consultations. For some women, 303 
the underlying world order cannot be reconciled with the possibility of losing a foetus due to a 304 
sample being taken, and even less with a termination of pregnancy. Procreation is seen as a gift 305 
from God; neither women nor doctors have the right to change the course of the pregnancy.  306 
In rare cases, couples explicitly refer to the religious authority frame when the practitioner has 307 
finished speaking. “Stop all the tests. I take full responsibility. Inshallah […] I want this baby, 308 
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Down Syndrome or not, no problem. It’s fate.” (African partner, France). In other cases, it is 309 
the practitioners themselves who mobilise this frame, to explore the woman’s opinion 310 
concerning the possibility of terminating the pregnancy. In the Paris centre, this strategy is 311 
frequently employed on women, who are assumed to be Muslims. Having delivered the 312 
standard information on the risk of DS and of miscarriage associated with taking a sample, the 313 
midwife asks the woman:  314 
Midwife: “You must tell me if you want us to do this test”.  315 
Woman “No”. 316 
Midwife: “Why don’t you want it?” 317 
Woman: “If there were no risk, I’d do it. In our country it’s not a good thing, because God will 318 
punish us”.  319 
Midwife: “If you knew for certain that the child had Down Syndrome, what would you do? We 320 
terminate the pregnancy or we continue?” 321 
Woman: “I can’t terminate”  322 
The midwife wants to be certain that the woman’s choice is truly rooted in religious authority 323 
and not in a “false belief” concerning the risk of a miscarriage. The woman’s confirmation 324 
generally puts an end to the interactions. Such situations often lead to reciprocal mistrust. This 325 
can be seen in the post-consultation comment made by a French consultant concerning a woman 326 
whose foetus is at risk of a genetic disease and who, for religious reasons, twice rejected the 327 
offer of a diagnostic test: “It’s not complicated. For us she just wouldn’t listen!”. The few times 328 
the woman spoke during the ultrasound examination shows how little she believed in 329 
technology. When the obstetrician observes that “the baby is not very big, especially the head”, 330 
she retorts: “my first child also had a small head, but afterwards it grew” (African woman, 331 
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France). Women’s mistrust of medicine can also be found in England: “the doctor told me that 332 
a baby would have disability but when the baby is born …it was a minor problem” 333 
The religious authority frame may remain latent in many situations; women turn to this frame 334 
to make a decision, without necessarily offering any justification, either because they feel it is 335 
a private matter, or because they fear a negative reaction or insistence from practitioners. 336 
 337 
The compassion frame 338 
Compassion offers no cognitive resources with which to make a decision; it is used to calm the 339 
anxiety which often increases as information is provided, and thus supports, or even re-340 
establishes, interactions. Compassion supposes that distress is recognised. It may be used in 341 
conjunction with the medico-scientific expertise frame to demonstrate empathy and 342 
benevolence, or when the practitioner becomes aware of the anxiety that the information has 343 
caused. Resources are numerous and heterogeneous; therefore, the compassion frame can be 344 
easily intertwined with other frames. It can be confined to demonstrations of neutral concern, 345 
such as the use of softly spoken verbal phrases (“it’s alright my darling”, “don’t worry about 346 
it”), or to gentle and kind-hearted gestures, such as passing a box of tissues to a woman who is 347 
crying, placing a hand on her arm, or using humour. The practitioner might signal his/her 348 
availability by suggesting another appointment or a telephone call: “if you are still worried 349 
when you get home, give me a ring” (Midwife, France). In certain cases, practitioners may 350 
suggest postponing the decision to a later date or term. Finally, the compassion frame can also 351 
be used in conjunction with that of medical authority, when the practitioner engages his/her 352 
subjectivity in the assessment of a test result: “in your case the risk is very, very low”.  353 
 354 
COMBINING FRAMES 355 
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The second analytical stage consisted of examining how the protagonists combine the different 356 
frames taking account of the eventual ruptures and adjustments that occur in the short time that 357 
consultations last, and their impact upon the nature and degree of fluidity of the interactions.30 358 
This systematic approach revealed a range of consultation configurations. We will focus on the 359 
three most frequent ones.  360 
 361 
When protagonists mobilise the same frame 362 
In several cases, the medico-scientific expertise frame is common to both practitioners and 363 
women – the latter are often already informed but require additional information to make or 364 
confirm their decision. The protagonists thus engage in continuous and fluid interactions, the 365 
scientific and technical content of which is rooted in evidence-based medicine.   366 
In the following extract, a couple has been referred to the French provincial centre for a risk of 367 
DS of 1:130. The woman wants more information about the risk of miscarriage, which the 368 
midwife estimated to be 1:200. The woman initiates the dialogue and concludes with her 369 
decision to have the amniocentesis:  370 
Woman: “It is very important to me to understand what you are telling me. If we don’t 371 
understand, the decision is not very informed”.  372 
The midwife writes her calculation on a piece of paper. X=100/130. The woman uses her 373 
calculator: “That gives 0.77. There is a 0.77 chance out of 100 that there is a problem [with the 374 
foetus]”. 375 
Midwife: “Tell yourself it’s a little less than 1%”. 376 
Woman: “I have less chance of losing the child because of a miscarriage, than of there being 377 
a problem”.  378 
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Three conditions favour fluid and continuous interactions in the medico-scientific expertise 379 
frame. Firstly, women must be engaged in this frame, of which they have some understanding, 380 
and be ready to receive or ask for scientific and technical information to make or confirm their 381 
decision. Secondly, it must be possible to contain the emotions that are generally aroused when 382 
talking about the risks of pregnancy. These two conditions are more easily met when women 383 
have been informed of their risk prior to the consultation and have already begun to think about 384 
it. Thirdly, there must be an opportunity for women to interact with practitioners. This means 385 
that either women feel it is legitimate to spontaneously interact or that practitioners encourage 386 
them to do so.  387 
 388 
When protagonists mobilise frames difficult to concile   389 
It is not rare for protagonists to approach a consultation using different frames. Such situations 390 
tend to rigidify interactions and sometimes lead to distortions likely to hinder the decision-391 
making process.  392 
When engaged in the medical authority frame, women do not expect a general explanation of 393 
pregnancy risks but the practitioner’s opinion of their personal situation. Above all, they seek 394 
reassurance and/or guidance. The medico-scientific expertise frame, which orients the 395 
practitioner’s attitude, and the medical authority frame which directs that of the women, thus 396 
enter into opposition. Waiting for an opinion on her personal situation that does not come, the 397 
woman may start to think that the technical information she is receiving is a prelude to the 398 
announcement of bad news. The length of time it takes to provide this information increases 399 
her distress further. In France, after quietly listening to the midwife explain the way DS 400 
screening works, receiving information on the pathology, with photos of children with the 401 
syndrome, a woman, of African origin, begins to cry and her partner, who can no longer keep 402 
quiet, interrupts the midwife: “Excuse me, but does this concern us?”.  403 
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The tension caused by the confrontation between the two frames generally leads to a high 404 
emotional charge that hinders the fluidity of the interactions. It can nevertheless be reduced by 405 
exposing the gap between the woman’s expectations and the demands of the medico-scientific 406 
expertise frame. This is what the midwife attempts to do when she begins her consultation with 407 
a preamble destined to reassure the couple: “The first thing we need to be clear on is that baby 408 
might be absolutely normal, OK? This is a risk assessment” (Midwife, England). However, the 409 
concept of risk is not always well understood and the preamble not always enough to contain 410 
emotions. These situations have different outcomes. The decision might be postponed and a 411 
new appointment made, as is often the case in France. The woman might also choose to have 412 
the sample taken as a way of resolving the distress caused by the expert discourse.  413 
The women/couples who approach pregnancy and its monitoring through the frame of religious 414 
authority do not begin consultations with the intention of gathering information that will help 415 
them to make a decision. Their decision has already been made. Yet they are rarely given the 416 
opportunity to express their position from the outset and some women feel that they do not have 417 
the legitimacy to interrupt the practitioner and assert their point of view. As for the practitioner, 418 
providing neutral, objective scientific and technical information is a regulatory duty. 419 
Practitioners must obtain signed consent from women before taking a sample. As they do not 420 
know how their colleagues informed the patient, or how the information had been understood, 421 
they repeat the entire content. When the opinion is based on medico-scientific expertise, there 422 
is no major problem. However, when the decision (not to have a sample taken) has been made 423 
in the religious authority frame, the situation is very different. The practitioner’s pursuit of 424 
his/her role to inform can be interpreted as a lack of respect, as the invalidation of the couple’s 425 
point of view, a way of asserting that only medico-scientific expertise can legitimately form the 426 
basis for a decision. Again, the length of time taken to provide the information tends to increase 427 
the emotional charge which then translates into mistrust and resentment, and which can lead to 428 
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an obstinate silence or, sometimes, definitive remarks: “Doctors don’t know anything; only 429 
God knows” (France). This consultation configuration does not provide the conditions required 430 
for fluid interactions. The tension can sometimes be resolved when the content of the 431 
interactions shifts towards the routine monitoring of the pregnancy. It can reach a peak when 432 
the practitioner looks to protect him/herself from any legal action by noting in the medical file 433 
that the woman, after receiving all of the required information, refuses to undergo a diagnostic 434 
examination.  435 
When protagonists adjust frames to restore fluid and continuous interactions  436 
In situations where dialogue is blocked or where the emotional charge is high, temporarily or 437 
definitively abandoning the frame of medico-scientific expertise can sometimes be, for 438 
practitioners, the only way of restoring interaction. A shift into the repertoire of medical 439 
authority or compassion, repeated as many times as is necessary, can revitalise interactions.  440 
So when explanations relating to DS are interrupted by the partner of a woman, who asks 441 
“Excuse me, but does this concern us?”, the midwife realises that the information has not been 442 
understood. She therefore momentarily ceases to impart knowledge to the couple, and brings 443 
her subjectivity into play to reassure them: “You are 30 years old, I’m not worried, but I have 444 
to talk to you like this; it’s so that I can explain”. The incursion into the reassuring medical 445 
authority frame enables the midwife to return to that of medico-expertise. The interactions 446 
continue, the midwife pays attention to the couple’s needs and mobilises resources to support 447 
her actions:  448 
Midwife: “Amniocentesis is the only way to be sure”. 449 
Partner: “As you said, there’s a risk, so it’s better not to do that”. 450 
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Midwife: “It all depends on what is important for you. If this pregnancy is very important and 451 
you don’t want to risk a miscarriage, then I say ‘fine’. If you tell me that you don’t want a child 452 
with Down Syndrome, then I also say ‘fine’”.  453 
Partner:  “It’s her decision”.  454 
Midwife: “We can take our time. We can meet again in a few days so that I can explain again.  455 
Woman: “I prefer to think about it. […] What if we redo the ultrasound to look again at the 456 
neck?” 457 
Midwife: We only do that at the start of the pregnancy”. 458 
The decision is deferred, the midwife notes down the information she has given to the woman 459 
and a new appointment is made.  460 
The temporary abandon of the medico-scientific expertise frame and the incursion into that of 461 
medical authority for reasons of solicitude allowed to restore the course of interactions. In 462 
France, many consultations demonstrated this type of adjustment.  463 
More rarely, the practitioner’s recourse to the medical authority frame causes a turning point in 464 
the course of the consultation. In France, a woman of Muslim faith consults the geneticist who 465 
had monitored her when the child she had given birth to one year ago died of a genetic disease 466 
only a few days old. Pregnant again, she is terrified that it might happen again:   467 
Woman: I don’t know what to do. I’m lost. 468 
Consultant: Let me simplify. There are two attitudes, both of which are acceptable. It’s up to 469 
you to decide which is the best for you.  470 
Woman: That’s what’s difficult. I can’t make a decision. 471 
Consultant: Let me summarise. If we don’t do anything […] three times out of four everything 472 
will be fine. One time out of four the child will have the same disease as [first child] and 473 
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unfortunately there’ll be nothing we can do. It will die during the first few days of its life. Second 474 
solution, we perform a biopsy at 12 weeks. We’ll have the results one week later. Three times 475 
out of four there’ll be nothing, and you can relax. […] 476 
Woman: In fact I’m scared of taking the risk of losing a child who is not ill.  477 
Consultant: Unfortunately, that can happen. […]” 478 
Woman: What is the risk of me miscarrying? 479 
Woman: No, I’d never get over it!” […] What do you think I should do? 480 
Consultant: I fear that you’re never going to be able to relax during this pregnancy […] 481 
exceptionally, I’m going to allow myself to give you my opinion. It’s up to you to make the 482 
decision. It’s maybe worth taking the 1% risk. Even though you don’t know what you’ll do 483 
afterwards”.  484 
The change of frame gives the woman the opportunity to mention her partner’s refusal to have 485 
a sample taken, a refusal rooted in the religious authority frame. She fears a possible 486 
miscarriage, for which she would be blamed. The geneticist, adapting to the situation, offers to 487 
take some of the responsibility by producing a letter addressed to the partner, and that he vocally 488 
records in the woman’s presence: “we believe that the benefit you will get from knowing the 489 
status of your child, healthy or ill, is a real one, because it will allow you to project yourselves 490 
into this pregnancy. Something that you are having trouble doing.” 491 
This form of benevolent directiveness shows the woman that her distress and needs have been 492 
taken seriously. By looking together at the available possibilities, the woman and the 493 






Over the past three decades, genetic counselling has undergone many transformations, 498 
increasing regulation and standardisation of PND consultations. Although the objective is to 499 
take better account of women’s viewpoints in a decision-making process, these changes give 500 
PND consultations a particularly restrictive framework. The obligation placed upon 501 
practitioners to inform women, in an objective, neutral and accessible way, of the two types of 502 
risk that they are facing (that of having a disabled child and that of having a miscarriage) tends 503 
to make interactions more rigid. Our observations confirm the obstacles that stand in the way 504 
of this objective. They demonstrate the distress women experience when having to make a 505 
decision that affects the life of the child they carry,31 and the difficulty for practitioners to 506 
maintain neutrality in light of the heterogeneity of women's backgrounds, their beliefs, level of 507 
understanding as well as social and ethnic origins.21 Our study suggests that in most situations 508 
the stated objective of neutrality is unachievable. However, one might also question what the 509 
objective of these consultations actually is. If the objective is to guarantee women’s and 510 
couple’s freedom of choice, our analysis suggests several ways to achieve it. Reaching a 511 
decision on whether or not to have a sample taken, after understanding everything that is at 512 
stake, is just one of several modalities for achieving this objective. Furthermore, as we have 513 
seen, this modality supposes that the protagonists engage in a common frame, that of the 514 
medico-scientific expertise, that emotions do not run too high and that women feel that they 515 
can legitimately interact with the practitioners. Yet these conditions are far from being 516 
systematically met.  517 
The first lesson learned from our analysis is that the protagonists can participate in the 518 
consultation by navigating between different frames, which can lead to communication 519 
problems and distortions. For the practitioner engaged in the medico-expertise frame, the act of 520 
informing in a neutral and objective manner is the condition for respecting the woman’s 521 
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autonomy, whereas for the woman engaged in the medical authority frame, it can be a sign of 522 
imminent bad news. Designed to help the woman make her decision, information instead causes 523 
distress and hinders her reflective capacities. Similarly, whilst for the practitioner the act of 524 
informing is a prerequisite of consent, for the woman engaged in the religious authority frame, 525 
it can be interpreted as the negation of her opinion – an opinion she is not even asked to give. 526 
Once brought to light, it should be possible to find practical solutions for these distortions.   527 
The second lesson learned from our analysis is that the emergence of a decision does not come 528 
about in a unique action frame that should be preferred. On the contrary, we were able to 529 
identify different configurations resulting from distinct arrangements of the frames used during 530 
consultations. This might mean repeated incursions into the compassion and/or medical 531 
authority frames to contain emotion, to then return to the medico-scientific expertise frame; or 532 
an assumed distancing from the role of expert; or a voluntary and assumed delegation to medical 533 
authority. In other words, despite the considerable constraint that practice regulations impose 534 
upon the coordination of actions, in certain situations the protagonists manage to restore fluid 535 
and continuous interaction, adapted to their expectations and values and orienting them towards 536 
a decision.4 This observation clearly demonstrates the limited relevance of abstract notions such 537 
as neutrality and non-directiveness when it comes to qualifying and taking account of the work 538 
done by protagonists during consultations. The various configurations of consultations 539 
identified in our analysis indicate that, on the contrary, practitioners’ relational involvement, 540 
and even in some cases practitioners’ directiveness, might be necessary to maintain/ restore 541 
interaction and enable women and couples to exert their reflective capacities. 542 
Aiming for women’s autonomy as conceptualised in the philosophical tradition as rational 543 
individuals’ capacity for self-determination, may therefore not be appropriate to ‘real-life 544 
situations’ of PND consultations. Indeed, women’s enfranchisement from material and social 545 
considerations that underpins this definition was seldom observed in our consultations. Instead, 546 
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a sociological concept of autonomy based on a relational process involving all protagonists and 547 
enabling a mutual adjustment of actions might be better suited to generating a reflective 548 
approach to practice. From that perspective, respecting women’s and couples’ autonomy would 549 
be less about maintaining a neutral and non-directive attitude, and more about facilitating the 550 
expression of their reflective capacities.  551 
 552 
The frame analysis provides insights into the constraints that govern interactions. The way 553 
protagonists define the situation as well as their expectations reflect past experiences, which 554 
are themselves anchored in social structures and practices. For example, the medico-expertise 555 
frame is rooted in the ‘therapeutic modernity’ era: PND practitioners have acquired a specific 556 
conception of their mission and have developed routines for their consultations – based on their 557 
training, their experience, and on a certain number of rules – and have learned to adapt them to 558 
suit individual situations. By contrast, the medical authority frame is rooted in the “clinical 559 
tradition”.2 Women who engage in that frame tend to defer to its representative and expect to 560 
be reassured, or at least advised on their particular situation. “People therefore must manage 561 
the plurality of frames, as well as the eventual ruptures of frames that rise in the course of 562 
interactions”.30 Being cognisant of this plurality might encourage practitioners to consider 563 
women’s viewpoints, and thus promote interactions. It might also result in making the medico-564 
expertise frame intelligible to women, for example, by making it clear that the information they 565 
are about to receive is not specific to their situation but is given to all women, and is designed 566 
to “train” them in scientific reasoning to help them make a decision.  567 
 568 
It would seem hazardous to compare PND practices in England and France on the basis of our 569 
data due to the small number of observations and the diversity of the populations. Moreover, 570 
the way pregnancy monitoring is organised is different. It appears to be more delineated in 571 
25 
 
England, thus making it possible to limit the number of acts and, therefore, better control 572 
spending. This can also be seen in the legal framework governing practices, with regard to the 573 
thresholds at which samples may be taken (higher in England) and in the lower number of 574 
ultrasound examinations that are recommended. This observation is reminiscent of public fund 575 
management practices found in England since the 1980s and the way in which the new rules 576 
and procedures introduced by the State have durably guided the behaviour of health actors.32 In 577 
France, pregnancy monitoring is more flexible, and although PND practices have been 578 
subjected to greater regulation since the 1990s, practitioners retain relative autonomy.33 579 
As we observed, in England these differences lead to the virtual absence of recourse to the 580 
religious authority frame, because women who are engaged in this frame and refuse to take the 581 
risk of miscarriage, generally do not move on to the second decision-action sequence that 582 
constitutes the subject of this study. By the same reasoning, due to this filtering of the care 583 
pathway, women who are not opposed to a sample being taken tend to be better informed about 584 
their situation and more familiar with the medico-scientific logic than the women observed in 585 
France.  586 
Yet more subtle differences can also be observed. English practitioners seem to more frequently 587 
adopt attitudes of neutrality and non-directiveness and demonstrate a stronger attachment to the 588 
medico-scientific expertise frame, whereas French practitioners do not hesitate to distance 589 
themselves from it. English practitioners also appear to be more involved in the mission to 590 
educate women – something that is especially evident in the level of detail in the information 591 
provided that is greater than in consultations in France. Here we find the expression of a form 592 
of incorporation of the tools that regulate practices and provide guidelines.32 This avenue of 593 
interpretation nevertheless needs to be verified in a later study, as these differences might also 594 
be attributed to practitioners adapting to women’s individual characteristics and might reflect 595 
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